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Standard game theoretic models predict, based on subgame perfection, that public
goods will not be provided even if agents are allowed to monitor free riders at
some cost.  Further, because punishment is not credible in these environments,
this prediction is invariant to the size of groups.  However, there is now
substantial evidence that people are reciprocally motivated and will punish free
riders, regardless of the material costs of doing so.  To examine the implications
of reciprocally-minded agents, we simulate an environment populated with the
behavioral strategies often seen in the experimental lab and use the simulation to
develop hypotheses that are more specific about why group size should matter
when sanctions are allowed.  We then test these hypotheses experimentally using
the voluntary contribution mechanism.  We examine whether the effect of group
size is purely due to the number of group members or if information about other
group members is what is important.  We find large groups provide public goods
at levels no less than small groups because punishment does not fall in large
groups.  However, hindrances to monitoring do reduce the provision of the public
good.
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Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common:
because it is easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each must perceive,
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning of the
whole project.  But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand
persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so
complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each
seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and would lay the whole
burden on the others.
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J.M. Dent, 1952, II, 239)
1. Introduction
Despite standard game-theoretic predictions concerning behavior in social
dilemma situations such as the provision of a public good, experimental evidence
shows that free riding is not the first impulse of economic agents.  In fact, average
contributions of between forty and sixty percent of an agent’s endowment
(despite the dominant strategy to contribute nothing) are common starting points
with only a small minority of participants completely free riding in the first
period of the standard, finitely repeated game (Davis and Holt [1993], Ledyard
[1995]).  These results have begun to have an impact on the study of economics.
Theoretically, they have been an impetus behind new theories of more realistic,
but nonstandard, preferences for reciprocity, fairness and altruism (Andreoni
[1990],  Rabin [1993], Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Falk and Fischbacher [1998],
Bolton and Ockenfels [1999]).  And, on a more practical level, this research has
provided behavioral foundations for empirical results demonstrating that team
production, among other forms of public goods provision, are effective without
exogenous intervention (Prendergast [1999]).
Although contributions are positive to start, they do fall off significantly
by the end of most experiments which, to some degree, vindicates theories based
on subgame perfection.  However, there have been a number of recentPunishing Free Riders          2
1 Further, being costly implies punishment is not credible.
2 It is important to note that these models do not assume a preference for, or non-material
benefits from, punishing free riders.  Instead the models show that strategies with a punishing
component survive when selection is based of the material payoff of strategies alone.
experiments showing that, if participants can mutually monitor, i.e. inspect the
decisions made by other participants and sanction behavior deemed antisocial, the
incentive to free ride is largely attenuated (Fehr and Gaechter [2000a], Bowles et
al. [2001], Page and Putterman [2000], Sefton et al. [2000]). This result also runs
contrary to standard theory because punishment, in these experiments, is costly
and therefore participants can do better by free riding on the punishment done by
others.
1
Despite subgame perfection preventing punishment from being a
component of the standard theory of public goods, equilibria do exist in which
punishment is used to elicit positive contributions and, depending on the initial
population distribution of strategies, evolutionary models have demonstrated that
punishing strategies often survive (Sethi [1996], Carpenter et al. [2001]).
2  These
models are much more in line with what one sees in the experimental lab.
Given people punish and evolutionary game theory provides
microfoundations for this behavior, in this paper we are interested in the effects of
group size on the ability of punishing strategies to survive and enforce
contributions to a public good.  If we assume people are willing to spend a certain
amount of their resources to monitor other group members, there are (at least)
two possible, but at this point ambiguous,  effects of larger groups.  First, larger
groups force monitors to spread their resources thinner which might lead to more
free riding; but notice there are also more people monitoring each free rider so it
is not obvious whether the total amount of punishment each free rider receives
will increase or decrease.
A second possible effect has little to do with the fact that there are more
people in large groups.  Instead, we might consider a logistical hypothesis which
states that large groups are less able to elicit contributions because monitoringPunishing Free Riders          3
3 For a plausible explanation of why contributions do not fall off as quickly in large groups
see the discussion of the minimum profitable coalition in Davis and Holt [1993].
becomes more difficult.  As groups grow it becomes harder for each individual to
monitor everyone else and, as a result, free riding might become easier to hide
and punishment becomes less of a deterrent.  But, notice that if the “monitoring
groups” overlap such that everyone is seen by some minimum fraction of the rest
of the group, then punishment might still be sufficient to elicit contributions.
Because the effects of size in terms of numbers of agents and the
information agents have about each other is unclear, in section 3 of this paper we
present agent-based simulations which were run to derive clearer hypotheses
concerning when group size might matter.  Then, in sections 4 and 5 we discuss
an experiment that was conducted to test our hypotheses with real agents.  We
begin, in section 2, by discussing other relevant research. 
2. Previous and Related Experiments
The impact of group size on behavior in public goods games has already been
studied experimentally.  So far however, experiments have only been conducted
that (1) use game environments that do not allow free riders to be sanctioned and
(2) do not consider the logistical problems of large groups.  The main result of
this literature is that contributions do not fall as groups become larger and, if
anything, they tend to increase. Isaac and Walker [1988] and Isaac et al. [1994] in
a comprehensive series of experiments examine groups of size four, ten, forty, and
one hundred participants.  Considering the relatively smaller groups (four and ten
persons), they find that size only matters when the return on the public good is
low, in which case, contributions actually increase in large groups.  When larger
groups (forty and one hundred persons) are examined, the authors find that
contributions increase relative to smaller groups and the effect is independent of
the return on the public good.
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4 However, considering the broader category of social dilemma experiments, Ostrom et al.
[1992] were the first to examine mutual monitoring.  Their experiment used the common pool
resource game in which players cooperate by refraining from extracting a commonly held
resource.  This work has been extended in Ostrom et al. [1994] and Moir [1998].
Interest is growing in the question of whether monitoring can increase
contributions in social dilemma experiments. The first public goods experiment
incorporating mutual monitoring was Fehr and Gaechter [2000a] who confirm the
reciprocity conjecture generated by Andreoni [1988].
4  Andreoni showed that
contributions decayed as would be expected by an equilibrium learning
hypothesis, but contrary to learning also showed that when the game was
restarted contributions returned to significantly high levels.  One explanation of
this result is that reciprocating participants withhold contributions to punish free
riders, and are willing to wipe the slate clean when the experiment is restarted.
More directly, Fehr & Gaechter show that when participants have some way,
other than withholding contributions, to punish free riders, they do so and
contributions increase.  
The work of Fehr and Gaechter piqued the interest of other researchers
who have confirmed their main result and extended the analysis in other
interesting directions. Bowles et al. [2001] develop a team production model based
on reciprocity which predicts punishment in equilibrium and test the model
experimentally.  The experiments substantiate the major hypothesis generated by
the model - transferring residual claimancy to a team increases reciprocators’
propensity to punish shirkers and this, in turn, increases the productive efficiency
of team production. Page and Putterman [2000] also confirm that punishment is
used to maintain or increase contributions.  In addition, they examine the role of
face-to-face communication which, from their preliminary analysis, seems to not
effect contribution decisions in the presence of punishment.  Another noteworthy
study was conducted by Sefton et al. [2000].  Their contribution is to examine the
relevance of rewards.  In one treatment they allow both rewards and sanctions,Punishing Free Riders          5
5 This methodology partially follows Miller et al. [2002] and Sethi and Somanathan [2001].
6 The surveyed papers include those discussed in section 2 plus Fehr and Gaechter [2000b] and
Keser and van Winden [2000].
and show that initially, rewards are used, but by the end of the experiment,
rewards give way to sanctions.
The experiments discussed above demonstrate two behavioral facts.
First, the number of people in a group, per se, does not matter.  Larger groups
appear to be at least as good at providing public goods.  Second, punishment is
used to elicit contributions in social dilemma situations.  While these facts are
important in isolation, so far there has been no research linking the roles of
punishment and group size in social dilemma situations.  In the experiments
presented below, we show that when monitoring is possible group size will only
result in lower contributions to the extent that larger groups disrupt the amount
of information agents have about each other.
3. Using Simulations to Derive the Effects of Group Size 
To generate specific hypotheses about how group size will affect the provision of a
public good in an environment where some agents punish free riders, we chose to
populate a computer with finitely complex automata of the different types we
usually see in the experimental lab and have them play a public goods game with
some selection pressure.
5  Surveying the experimental literature on punishment in
public goods experiments, one generally finds four behavioral types: unconditional
free riders, unconditional cooperators, reciprocally-minded tit-for-taters, and
cooperators who punish free riders.
6
We consider the five behavioral types represented in figure 1.  Each type
is finitely complex (a la Sethi and Somanathan [2001]) because it operates in a
finite number of states.  Our machines have either one or two states.  Call the
initial state that each machine starts in the passive state and the state that canPunishing Free Riders          6
be triggered by the behavior of the rest of the group, the alert state..  There are
two one-state machines who are permanently in the passive state: Free Riders
who free ride regardless of what other agents do, and Contributors who contribute
unconditionally.
The two-state machines are slightly more complex.  Each of the these
machines starts in a cooperatively passive state and will remain cooperative as
long as there are not too many free riders in the group.  Define f as the fraction of
all agents in the group that are currently free riding.  For n agents indexed
i=1...n, each of machines 3 through 5 are endowed with a trigger, "i
0{0.1,0.2,0.3,...1}, which determines whether the machine transits from the
passive state to the alert state or back.  Specifically, if f >"i then there are
enough free riders to alert the machine.  Likewise if f <"i then the machine
remains in, or transits back to, its cooperative passive state.  We call machine 3
Generalized Tit-for-Tat because it starts in the cooperative state, but will be
alerted by a sufficiently high frequency of free riders, in which case, it free rides
until the frequency of free-riding falls below "i. 
There are two punishing strategies, Nice Punishers and Mean Punishers
and each punisher will spend up to its accumulated material earnings to monitor
all the free riders it sees.  Each punisher looks at the other group members
individually and will continue to punish until it runs out of resources or punishes
all the free riders - which ever happens first.  To keep things simple, punishers
incur a cost, c, to punish each free rider they stumble across and each sanction
inflicts 2c harm on the target. While each punisher spends at most c to monitor
any individual, each free rider accumulates as many sanctions as there are
punishers who catch it and still have available resources.  Nice Punishers
contribute in the passive state and once f rises above "i they punish free riders
while continuing to cooperate.  Mean Punishers differ because they are somewhat
hypocritical - in the alert state they punish even though they free ride themselves.
The n group members of different types are arrayed randomly on a circle.
There are t periods.  At the beginning of each period all the agents decidePunishing Free Riders          7
whether to contribute their unit endowment or free ride.  The marginal and
average group benefit of a contribution is q and each q is shared equally.  Where
q/n<1<q holds the group faces a social dilemma.  After every agent makes its
contribution decision, f is calculated and each agent compares its trigger to f.
Those tit-for-taters who have been alerted will free-ride next period  (or continue
to free ride) and the alerted punishers will search for currently free riding agents.
Those agents for whom f is below their trigger transit back to the passive state
and cooperate the following period.  Punishing strategies look at their immediate
neighbors and then flip from left to right until everyone has been monitored or
they run out of resources.  The payoff function for each agent is:
where  xi0{0,1} is an agent’s contribution, pij  is the sanction agent i assigns to
agent j, and pji is the sanction agent i receives if caught free riding by agent j.
The group evolves in the following sense.  At the end of each period a
fraction of the population is replaced randomly and the probability that any type
takes over an empty position is based on the current population distribution of
types.   In simpler analytical models, Borgers and Sarin [1997] have shown that
this process leads to the standard replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker [1978]).
Specifically, the lowest performing five percent of the population, in terms of
accumulated resources, are culled every period and replaced by an agent who
chooses a type by randomly selecting one of the existing group members and
imitating it.
We also allow for mutation.  Mutation acts only on the trigger of
population sensitive agents (i.e. machines 3 through 5).  At the very end of each
period each agent faces a 1 in 100 chance of having its trigger randomly changed.
Lastly, we used c=1 and consider two values of q/n, 0.30 and 0.75, which
correspond to our experiments with real agents.  For what follows group size
refers to the number of agents in a group and monitoring fraction refers to thePunishing Free Riders          8
7 Changing the parameters of interests (e.g. the cost of punishment, the number of agents
culled each period, and the rate of mutation on the trigger) affects only the rate of decline in
the average contribution rate because they partially determine the likelihood that punishing
strategies will take over the population.  The treatment differences we discuss below all
persist when the parameters are changed.
fraction of the group each punishing type can monitor.  We wish to generate two
hypotheses: (1) what happens to the contribution rate when groups size increases
and (2) what happens to the contribution rate when the monitoring fraction falls.
We started each simulation from a balanced population (i.e. 20% of each type).
Initial runs of the simulation indicated that most realizations achieved an
equilibrium within 100 periods.  
Individual realizations of the simulation have the same characteristics as
individual groups in the experimental lab.  In many of the realizations the group
was quickly taken over by free riders and contributions declined to zero.
However, it was not uncommon (as seen in Sethi [1996] and Carpenter et al.
[2001]) for the group to eliminate free riding and settle on a distribution of
machines dominated by unconditional cooperators, but with substantial numbers
of nice punishers and tit-for-taters (mean punishers do very poorly because they
punish and are punished; however they are rarely driven to extinction after the
free riders have disappeared because the selective pressures fall to random drift
when everyone cooperates).
7  To account for the likelihood of different equilibria
being achieved, for each hypothesis we ran 1000 realizations of the model and
report the average contribution rate over these 1000 realizations for 100 periods.
Figures 2 & 3 here
To generate the group size hypothesis we start with a group of 50 agents
and then compare what happens to the average contribution rate as we increase
the population to 100 and 200 agents.  Figures 1 and 2 show the contribution
rates for each population size.  One can see that independently of thePunishing Free Riders          9
productivity of the public good there is no negative effect of group size on
contributions when agents punish.  In fact, contributions tend to rise as in the
experiments of Isaac and Walker [1988] and Isaac et al. [1994].  Apparently, the
effect of having more eyes watching dominates the effect of running out of
resources with which to punish.  We get:
The Group Size Hypothesis: When agents monitor each other, contributions
will not decrease as the number of group members increases.
To generate the monitoring fraction hypothesis we maintain the group
size of 50 agents but vary the fraction of the group each punisher sees.  In the
Full  treatment, punishers can monitor every other group member.  In the Half
treatment, punishers only get to see half the other group members (starting from
their immediate neighbors) and in the Tenth treatment punishers see only one-
tenth of the other group members (again, starting from their immediate
neighbors).  Returning to figures 2 and 3 we see a substantial effect of the
monitoring fraction.  The relationship is monotonic - the fewer free riders each
punisher can monitor, the lower is the contribution rate.  We get:
The Monitoring Fraction Hypothesis: When agents monitor each other,
contributions will decrease as the fraction of the group each punisher can monitor
decreases.
4. Experimental Design
The experiment closely resembles Fehr and Gaechter [2000a].  The instructions
used by Fehr & Gaechter frame the experiment as a group project.  Their framing
attempts to coordinate the way that subjects perceive the experiment (i.e. as a
social dilemma). Although this is a valid approach, the current experiment uses
the more standard language of the voluntary contribution mechanism to providePunishing Free Riders          10
8 The instructions for a typical session appear in the appendix.
mutual monitoring with as difficult a test as possible and also to relate more
directly to the standard literature.
8  Further, Fehr & Gaechter examine mutual
monitoring in groups of partners (subjects stay in the same group for the entire
experiment) and in groups of strangers (subjects are randomly reassigned to a
new group after each period).  To avoid the potential confound of repeated game
effects, and because this type of strategic behavior is un-modeled in the
simulations, all the sessions discussed below used the strangers protocol.
   The standard voluntary contribution game was augmented as in Fehr
and Gaechter [2000a] to allow participants to monitor each other.  Let each
participant be endowed with wi experimental francs and let pij be the number of
points assigned to j by i, then each subject’s payoff, Bi, can be described by the
following payoff function
where  is the number points assigned to i by all the other group
members divided by 10 so that 1-min[1, pi] is the fraction of i’s payoff she keeps
after being punished.  c(pij) is the cost of imposing pij points on player j and xi is
i’s public contribution.  Define the marginal per capita return (MPCR) as the
marginal individual benefit from contributing normalized by its opportunity cost -
the benefit of not contributing.  For free riding to be subgame perfect we simply
make MPCR<1.  In this experiment subjects participated in either the low
MPCR  treatment (MPCR=.30) or the high MPCR treatment (MPCR=.75).
As mentioned above, to monitor free riders participants assigned what
the instructions neutrally referred to as points. It was costly to assign points and
each point assigned to another player reduced her gross payoff for the period by
ten percent, up to a maximum of one hundred percent.  Hence, other groupPunishing Free Riders          11
9 The payoff function for the experiment differs from that used in the simulations because the
automata’s contribution choice is binary and therefore automata can not condition their
punishment choices on how much another group member free rides.  This complication might
be interesting to examine in a future project where one was trying to mimic experimental
results exactly rather than qualitatively.
10 The instructions made explicit the fact that everyone was seen by at least one other group
member.
members could reduce a player’s gross earnings to zero, but no further (unless the
target also punished other players).
9  The punishment cost function used in the
experiment, c(pij), was
Points Given Player j, pij : 























Along with changes in the MPCR, group size was manipulated in two
ways.  To test the group size hypothesis we simply changed the size of groups.  In
one treatment participants were divided into teams of five persons and in the
other we increased the team size to ten persons.  To investigate the monitoring
fraction hypothesis, we maintained five person groups but varied the number of
other subjects each player could monitor.  In the Full treatment, group members
saw the decisions made by everyone else in the group and could monitor them all.
In the Half treatment, group members could only monitor half of the other group
members, but the monitoring groups overlapped so that everyone was seen.  In
the  Single treatment, subjects saw only one other group member, but again,
everyone was seen by someone else.
10  Hence, the monitoring fraction treatment
variable is a proxy for the informational effect of increasing the group size and,
because monitoring groups overlap, we conform as closely as possible to the
simulated hypothesis.Punishing Free Riders          12
11 Included in these numbers are four control sessions we ran as replications of the standard
voluntary contribution game to demonstrate that our protocol and participants were
consistent with standard results.  Because contributions decayed and the rate of decay
depended on the MPCR, we concluded that our treatments and not our language or
participants were responsible for the results presented in section 5.
A total of 20 sessions were conducted with 350 participants.
11  Subjects
were recruited by email from the general student population and none had ever
participated in an economics experiment before.  Each subject was given a five
dollar show-up fee when he or she arrived and was then seated at a computer
terminal which was partially isolated (there were blinds on each side) so that
decisions were made privately.  Each session lasted about 45 minutes from sign in
to payments and subjects earned $17.44 on average, including the show-up fee.
A typical session was conducted as follows.  There were ten periods and
each  period was split into three stages, the contribution stage, the monitoring
stage, and a summary of the results for the period.  The contribution decision was
to allocate twenty experimental francs between a private account which only
benefitted the individual, and a public account which benefitted everyone in the
group according to the payoff function.  Once all the contributions were recorded,
participants learned the group total contribution and their individual gross
earnings.
Next, the experiment moved to the second stage.  Here participants saw
the individual contribution decisions made by other members of their current
group.  Based on this information subjects could assign up to ten points to each
of the other team members. They assigned points by paying out of their
accumulated earnings.  The total cost of punishing others was calculated
according to the cost of punishment function, c(pij).  When everyone had finished
the second stage, the experiment moved to the third stage where subjects saw a
summary of their net payoffs (after subtractions for punishing others and for
being punished) for the current period.Punishing Free Riders          13
12 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for distributional differences and Wilcoxon tests of differences
in contributions pooled across the ten periods support this claim for both MPCR treatments.
For the low MPCR we have ks=0.81, p<0.01; z=-7.76, p<0.01 and for the high MPCR we
have ks=0.48, p<0.01; z=-5.29, p<0.01.
13 Slight but significant.  The Wilcoxon rank sum statistic for the difference in the first and
last periods is z=-2.63, p=.01.
14 Despite a slight ‘endgame’ effect, the averages are not significantly below 100 percent
contribution.  In the low MPCR case the Wilcoxon signed ranks test yields z=-0.75, p=0.45,
and in the high MPCR treatment we have z=-1.20, p=0.23.
Notice that if we assume standard preferences for participants (i.e. they
only care about their own payoffs) then punishing is not a credible threat because
it is costly and any potential returns (i.e. getting a free rider to contribute) are
divided equally among all the other team members - alternatively, the fact that
the game is finitely repeated precludes punishment as part of any subgame
perfect equilibrium.  This implies that no one should punish, and given this, no
one should fear being punished from which it follows that free riding is still a
dominant strategy.
5. Results of the Experiment
To begin our analysis of the group size hypothesis we note that contributions to
the public good do not diminish as the number of people in a group increases.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the average fraction of the endowment contributed to the
public good in each period for each Full monitoring treatment.  These figures
clearly demonstrate that the effect of mutual monitoring does not diminish when
we double the size of groups.
12  In five person groups, mutual monitoring largely
maintains the initial level of contributions with only a slight increase in the high
MPCR treatment.
13  By contrast, in ten person groups mutual monitoring
increases contributions to nearly 100 percent by the end of the experiment for
both MPCR treatments.
14  Hence, when group members can monitor each other,
large groups are actually better at eliciting contributions than small groups.  NotePunishing Free Riders          14
15 Except possibly for Ameden et al. [1998] who show that endogenously sorting players by
contribution achieves high levels of contributions, but it is unclear if this result is independent
of the MPCR.
16 Note, free riding can not explain the reduced willingness to help in large groups because free
riders would not help in either case - i.e. they would not be sensitive to group size.
the similarities between our simulated results and the experiment.  In both cases
punishment leads to higher contributions when groups grow in size and this effect
is independent of the MPCR.  Comparatively, the experiment conforms exactly to
the simulated group size hypothesis.
Figures 4 & 5 here
Figures 4 and 5 document another unexpected result.  To the knowledge
of the author, this is the first voluntary contribution experiment in which full or
even nearly full contributions have been sustained without face-to-face
communication or draconian external regulation.
15  This result is particularly
important because contributions approach the social optima independently of the
MPCR.
Although our automata are programed to either contribute or not and to
punish or not and this programming is invariant to the size of the group, our
experimental participants, being more complex, may base their contribution and
punishment decisions on the size of the group.  Further, it may be the case that
our experimental contribution results match the simulations despite the
complexity of human subjects simply because the net effect of group size is zero
or positive.  For these reasons we dig deeper into our punishment data.
An interesting fact from social psychology is that people are typically less
likely to act prosocially in large groups.  First identified in Latane and Darley
[1970], psychologist have shown that, for example, bystanders are less likely to
help a stranger when many people have the opportunity to help.
16  In essence a
coordination problem arises - people agree help should be provided, but it isPunishing Free Riders          15
unclear in a large group exactly who should help.  In our experiment, punishing
free riders is a prosocial act like helping strangers.  We consider a regression
analysis to determine whether group size affects the punishment choices of our
participants.
Table 1 here
Table 1 reports the results of an analysis of the individual-level
punishment data.  We present both a probit analysis of the probability that one
agent monitors someone else and a least squares analysis of agents’ expenditures
on punishment.  For the probits, the dependent variable is one if the participant
punishes at least one other member of the group (zero otherwise) and the left-
hand side variable for the least squares analysis is a player’s total expenditure on
punishment.  The first four columns pool the data from both MPCR treatments
and the last four columns separate the data by MPCR to check the robustness of
the overall analysis.  Lastly, because our experiment generates a panel of data,
regressions 1(a) and 1(b) use robust standard errors to partially account for
possible interdependencies among our observations while the rest of the
regressions employ a different approach, random effects, to control for cross-
sectional differences.
The first thing to notice is that our real agents behave similarly to our
programed agents in that their decisions to punish or not seem invariant to the
number of people in a group.  After controlling for differences in the amount of
free riding in groups using the Avg Private and Avg Private
2 variables which are
the average private investment of the decision maker’s group and its square, and
the public contribution of the person punishing, Punisher’s Pub, we see that in
most circumstances the group size regressor, N, is not a significant determinant ofPunishing Free Riders          16
17 In other regression not reported in table 1 we corrected for two possible confounds.  First,
players tend to make higher gross earnings in larger groups and with higher MPCRs.  This
might lead to a wealth effect - players have more earnings to spend on punishment.  Second,
the implicit price of punishment in the experiment is not fixed.  On average, across
treatments, one point reduced the earnings of the targeted player by 2.41 francs which implies
the price of reducing a player’s earnings by 1 franc was 1/2.41 or 0.41 francs.  Rerunning the
regressions in table 2 with controls for these potential confounds (i.e. adding player gross
earnings and the implied price of punishment) does not change the results and neither effect
is significant.
whether players punish or not (probits).
17  Further, we see that contributors do
most of the punishing (i.e. the Punisher’s Pub term is positive and highly
significant).  This also matches the simulations where, on average, mean
punishers do considerably worse than nice punishers.  Notice, this result suggests
that our participants did not suffer from the kind of coordination problem
surrounding who should engage in prosocial acts in big groups that has been
found in previous psychological studies.
When we examine the amount a player spends on monitoring we get
similar results.  The groups size regressor is mostly insignificant, except for when
we look at the low MPCR treatment in isolation, in which case, players spend
significantly less on punishment in large groups, controlling for how cooperative
the group was.  The overall insignificance of the group size regressor in this case
implies that players are willing to allocate a set fraction of their earnings to
punishment and do not adjust this budgeting decision based on the number of
people they monitor.  In this respect, our players differ from the automata who
were programmed to spend all their income on monitoring if there were
sufficiently many free riders.  The last thing to notice about table 1 is that, while
contributors are more likely to monitor other players, they spend no more on
monitoring than other players.  This fact indicates that on the off chance a free
rider monitors in this treatment, she does so with vigor.
The second hypothesis states that the monitoring fraction should matter
because punishment will be less of a deterrent when each monitor sees fewer other
group members.  The data support this hypothesis.  Specifically, we find morePunishing Free Riders          17
18 In the low MPCR condition the single and full treatments are clearly different (ks=0.31,
p<0.01; z=3.49, p<0.01) as are the single and half treatments (ks=0.26, p=0.01; z=2.88,
p<0.01).  But, while the trend is for contributions to be maintained in the full treatment and
decline in the half treatment, the distributions of group contributions are not different
(ks=0.12, p=.0.56; z=0.87, p=0.39).
19 For the high MPCR condition the test statistics, based, as in note 16, on group
contributions, are as follows: full vs. half (ks=0.20, p=0.10; z=2.14, p=0.03), full vs. single
(ks=0.44, p<0.01; z=5.47, p<0.01), and single vs. half (ks=0.31, p<0.01; z=4.33, p<0.01).
free riding as the monitoring fraction falls.  Returning to figures 4 and 5, we see
plots of average contributions for the three monitoring fractions.  Compare again
the similarities between the time paths from our simulations (figures 2 and 3) and
the data from the experiment (figures 4 and 5).  As one can see, in the low
MPCR condition (figure 4) all three treatments start at contributions of forty
percent, but spread over time.  Similarly, in figure 5 the three treatments when
MPCR is high start at approximately fifty-five percent and then trifurcate.  Just
as the second hypothesis predicts, the single monitoring treatment is the least
effective at maintaining contributions, the half treatment is a little more effective,
and the full treatment is the most effective.
18,  19  Information appears to be an
important component of effective mutual monitoring.  In particular, mutual
monitoring does not work as well when the number of other group members that
one can see falls, even though it was made clear in the instructions that
monitoring groups overlap so that every free rider would be seen by someone else.
Table 2 summarizes a regression analysis similar to table 1 for the
punishment decisions in the monitoring fraction treatments.  Again, we report
probits and least squares regressions using robust standard errors and random
effects.  As when testing the group size hypothesis, we find punishment increases
in the severity of free riding, but the effect diminishes slightly in extreme cases
(i.e. Avg Private is positive and highly significant and its square is negative and
significant) and contributors are significantly more likely to punish than free
riders are.  With respect to who punishes, compared to the group size data, the
probit and least squares results are much more comparable in table 2.Punishing Free Riders          18
Specifically, in the monitoring fraction treatments contributors monitor more
often and spend more on monitoring.
Overall, there does not seem to be a robust effect of monitoring fraction
on participants’ likelihood of monitoring.  Using robust standard errors, players in
the Half treatment seem significantly less likely to monitor compared to players
in the Full treatment, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of random
effects (compare equations 1a and 2a).  Further, participants in the Single
treatment are neither more nor less likely to monitor, regardless of the method we
use.
Moving to an examination of the effects of our treatments on players’
monitoring expenditures, it seems obvious that expenditures, controlling for how
cooperative groups were, should fall when players see fewer other group members
- there are simply fewer opportunities to monitor.  This is more or less what we
see in the data.  Equations 1b and 2b show that regardless of our method,
expenditures on monitoring fall when players can not see all the other group
members.  However, notice that expenditures fall more in the Half treatment than
in the Single treatment indicating that when players can see only one other group
member they assume more responsibility for making sure that this person
behaves.
Underlying the overall result that players are equally likely to punish in
each monitoring fraction treatment, but spend less when they see less than the
entire group, are differences in responses by MPCR treatment.  The Half
treatment appears to have a strong effect in the low MPCR treatment while the
Single treatment matters more for players in the High MPCR treatment.
To summarize our results with respect to the effects of monitoring
fraction, overall players do not appear systematically less likely to monitor
individual other group members when they see fewer of them, but they do spend
less money on monitoring when they see fewer group mates.  Notice that these
results mimic the programming of our automata who punish equally all the free
riders they are allowed to see. As in our simulated games, these two resultsPunishing Free Riders          19
(monitor no less, but allocate fewer total resources) imply free riders are punished
less severely when the monitoring fraction falls because they are seen by fewer
eyes.  As a result, free riding increases.  
So far we have established that contributions fall with a reduction in the
monitoring fraction because free riders are punished less severely in smaller
monitoring groups.  We can also investigate another, un-simulated, reason why
large groups might suffer more free riding.  Again, we are allowing for the fact
that real agents may behave more complexly than our automata.  An auxiliary
hypothesis we can entertain is that the monitoring fraction will influence the
relationship between being punished and increasing one’s contribution in the
future.  It might be reasonable to expect that free riders will respond less to
punishment when the monitoring fraction falls because they perceive that it is
easier to get away with not contributing if there are fewer eyes watching.
We test this extension of Hypothesis 2 using individual data.  To do so
we regress free rider’s responses on the punishment they receive and other
treatment variables to see whether free riders respond less to punishment in
groups where the number of monitors is restricted.  Table 3 summarizes the
evidence supporting this proposition.  The dependent variable is the difference in
a player’s contribution between periods t-1 and t.  Lag Points is the total number
of punishment points assigned to the player in period t-1.  There are three
dummy variables to identify each treatment.  MPCR dummy takes the value one
when the MPCR is high, Half dummy is one to designate the Half treatment, and
Single dummy is one to indicate the Single treatment.  We also examine
interactions between the points assigned to the free rider (i.e. FR equals one when
a player contributes less than the group average in period t-1) and the treatments
to examine our hypothesis about free riders responses.  Finally, because the
dependent variable is bound between -20 and 20 we use random effects Tobit
methods in addition to our benchmark estimates with robust errors.
Equation 1 is a first pass at the data.  It confirms that players, in
general, respond as predicted to punishment, but the result is only marginallyPunishing Free Riders          20
significant suggesting there is more to the story.  Equations 2 and 3are much
better fits of the data because we allow for the differential impact of punishment
on free riders.  These two regressions illustrate that punishment directed at free
riders significantly changes behavior, but also of interest is the fact that the sign
on Lag Points now indicates that contributors reduce contributions if punished.
Hence, punishment in our experiment causes some regression to the mean
contribution.
Consider equation four which includes dummy variables to account for
treatment differences.  Note, the reference individual in the following analysis is a
contributor in the low MPCR, full monitoring condition.  To begin, the
MPCR×FR variable has a positive and highly significant coefficient which makes
sense.  We would expect that as the opportunity cost of contributing falls free
riders become more willing to contribute in the future.  We also find that the
signs on the Half×FR and Single×FR variables are positive indicating that, after
controlling for differences in the number of points assigned, free riders increase
contributions more than contributors in our limited monitoring treatments which,
again, makes sense.
Table 3 here
We can now sharpen the analysis by further interacting terms.  The
triple interaction of Lag Points by treatment by FR, allows us to ask if
punishment has more or less of an effect on free-riding in the different treatments.
As one can see in equation 5, in both monitoring fraction treatments, free rider
responses to punishment are still significantly negative suggesting that
participants in these treatments respond less, perhaps because they fear
punishment less.  Further, the coefficients suggest that participants become
increasingly obstinate when punished.  That is, the more punishment free riders
receive in the Half and Single treatments compared to the Full treatment, the
more they stubbornly free ride.  Notice also the relative size of the coefficients onPunishing Free Riders          21
the Half and Single triple interactions.  The large negative coefficient on the
Single interaction compared to the Half interaction indicates that free riders react
less to punishment as fewer monitors observe what they do.  These results are
interesting because they imply that free riders react differently to collective
shunning than to when only one individual confronts them.  Generalizing, free
riders seem to be more likely to dig in their heels to spite one goodie-goodie who
criticizes them, but, at the same time, they bend to follow a collectively
established norm.
6. Concluding Remarks
Traditional game theoretic formulations of public goods environments identify
free riding as a dominant strategy and therefore suggest that the addition of
costly, and therefore incredible, monitoring and increases in group size should not
matter.  However, this research shows that when we complicate this formulation
by taking seriously the behavioral heterogeneity seen in the experimental lab
which has been given microfoundations by evolutionary games, group size does
matter. 
By being more specific about why group size might matter our
simulations and experiments have demonstrated that large groups may be equally
adept at controlling free riders because members tend to sanction transgressors
without considering the fact that other monitors might also punish.  That is,
everyone in the group wants to show dissatisfaction with free riders, and as a
result, free riders are punished much more severely in large groups.  Obviously,
this behavior acts as a strong disincentive to continue free riding.
At the same time, however, our simulations and experiments suggest that
the logistics of large groups may hinder the ability of mutual monitoring to
discipline free riders.  It is clear that one logistical side effect of growing groups is
that it becomes difficult for each group member to keep an eye on all the other
members.  Our second major result illustrates why this aspect of large groupsPunishing Free Riders          22
might matter.  When we vary the size of monitoring groups from including
everyone to being composed of just one other member we find a significant
reduction in the amount that transgressors are punished and a weakening of free
riders reactions to punishment which, combined, translate into more free riding.
Our results are interesting because they help explain the dynamics of
work teams.  More specifically, these results might partially explain why we see
large productive teams (Hansen [1997], Knez and Simester [1998]).  In large
teams, shirkers should fear both a greater likelihood of being caught and increased
sanctions because most people monitor, but the extent to which this will act as a
deterrent depends on the transparency of the production process.  When effort
contributions are obvious, monitoring groups will be large and the threat of heavy
sanctions will keep shirkers in line.  However, when it is easy to hide your free
riding or mimic hard work, monitoring group size will fall and shirking will
become more prevalent.Punishing Free Riders          23
Figure 1 - The Simulated Two-State Automata. C indicates Contribute, FR
indicates Free Ride, P indicates punish free riders, and " is the trigger frequency
of free riding or contributing that determines behavior.Punishing Free Riders          24
Figure 2 - The Simulated Effect of Increased Group Size and Reduced Agent Information in
the MPCR=0.30 Treatment. (Full implies all group members are monitored by each agent,
Half means half are monitored, and Tenth means one-tenth are monitored).Punishing Free Riders          25
Figure 3 - The Simulated Effect of Increased Group Size and Reduced Agent Information in
the MPCR=0.75 Treatment.  (Full implies all group members are monitored by each agent,
Half means half are monitored, and Tenth means one-tenth are monitored).Punishing Free Riders          26
Figure 4 - The Elicited Effect of Increased Group Size and Reduced Participant Information
in the MPCR=0.30 Treatment.  (Full implies all group members are monitored by each
agent, Half means half are monitored, and Single means only one is monitored).Punishing Free Riders          27
Figure 5 - The Elicited Effect of Increased Group Size and Reduced Participant Information
in the MPCR=0.75 Treatment.  (Full implies all group members are monitored by each
agent, Half means half are monitored, and Single means only one is monitored).Punishing Free Riders          28
Dependant Variable = Punish or Not (Probit), Expenditure on Punishment (OLS & GLS))
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Notes: standard errors in parentheses.
           *** significant at the 0.01 level.
           ** significant at the 0.05 level.
           * significant at the 0.10 level.
Table 1 - The Effect of Group Size on Monitoring DecisionsPunishing Free Riders          29
Dependant Variable = Punish or Not (Probit), Expenditure on Punishment (OLS & GLS)
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Notes: standard errors in parentheses.
           *** significant at the 0.01 level.
           ** significant at the 0.05 level.
           * significant at the 0.10 level.
Table 2 - The Effect of the Monitoring Fraction on Punishment DecisionsPunishing Free Riders          30
Dependant Variable = xit -xit-1 (difference in public contribution)
Robust Random Effects Tobit
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Notes: standard errors in parentheses.
           *** significant at the 0.01 level.
           ** significant at the 0.05 level.
           * significant at the 0.10 level.
Table 3 - Do Free Riders Respond to Punishment?Punishing Free Riders          31
7. Appendix - Participant Instructions
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment.  For
participating today and being on time you have been paid $5.  You may earn an
additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the experiment.  This
money will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.  By clicking the
BEGIN button you will be asked for some personal information.  After everyone
enters this information we will start the instructions for the experiment.
Please be patient while others finish entering their personal information.  The
instructions will begin shortly.
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental Francs instead of
Dollars. Your payoffs will be calculated in terms of Francs and then translated at
the end of the experiment into dollars at the following rate: 30 Francs = 1 Dollar
Each participant receives a lump sum payment of 15 Francs at the beginning of
the experiment (on top of the $5.00 show-up payment).  This one-time payment
may be used to offset any losses that are incurred during the experiment.
However, it should be noted that you can ALWAYS avoid losses through your
own decisions.
The experiment is divided into 10 different periods.  In each period participants
are divided into groups of  5.  You will therefore be in a group with 4 other
participants. The composition of the groups will change randomly at the
beginning of each period.  Therefore, in each period your group will consist of
different participants.
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages.  In the first stage you will
decide how many francs you want to invest in each of two investment accounts.
One account is a Private Account, which only you benefit from.  The second
account is a Public Account, the benefits of which are shared equally by all
members of your group.  In the second stage of the period you will be shown the
investment behavior of the other members of your group.  You can then decide
whether you want to distribute points to members of your group.  If you
distribute points to other members of your group, their earnings will be reduced.
Now we will explain the two stages in more depth.
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At the beginning of every period each participant receives and endowment of  20
francs. You have to decide how much of this endowment you want to invest in
each of the two accounts mentioned above.  You are asked to invest in whole
franc amounts (i.e. an investment of 5 francs is alright, but 3.75 should be
rounded up to 4).
To record your investment decision, you will type the amount of francs you want
to invest in the Public and/or the Private account by typing in the appropriate
text-input box which will be yellow.  Once you have made your decision, there
will be a green Submit button that will record your investment decision.
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, each of you will
be informed of your Gross Earnings for the period.
Your Gross Earnings will consist of two parts:
1)     Your return on your Private Account.  Your Private Account returns 1
franc for each franc invested.  That is, for each franc invested in the Private
Account you get 1 franc back.
2)     Your return from the Public Account.  Your earnings (and everyone else's
in your group) is equal to 0.3 times the total investment by all members of the
group to the Public Account.
Your Earnings can be summarized as follows:
1×(Investment in Private Account) + 0.3×(Group Total Investment in Public
Account)
The income of each group member from the Public Account is calculated the
same way.  This means that each group member receives the same amount from
the total investment in the Public Account.  For example, consider the case of
groups with 5 members, if the total investment in the Public Account is 75 francs
(e.g. first group member invests 15 francs, the second 20, the third 10 and the
fourth and fifth 15 each) then each group member will receive  0.3×75 =  22.5
francs.  If the total investment was 30 francs then each group member would
receive 0.3×30 = 9 francs.Punishing Free Riders          33
For each franc you invest in the Private Account you get 1 franc back.  Suppose
however you invested this franc in the Public Account instead.  Your income
from the Public Account would  increase by 0.3×1 = 0.3 francs.  At the same
time the earnings of the other members of your group would also increase by 0.3
francs, so the total increase in the group's earnings would be  1.5 francs.  Your
investment in the Public Account therefore increases the earnings of the other
group members.  On the other hand your earnings increase for every franc that
the other members of your group invest in the Public Account.  For each franc
invested by another group member you earn 0.3×1 = 0.3 francs.
Stage Two
In stage two you will be shown the investment decisions made by other members
of your group and they will see your decision.  Also at this stage you can reduce
the earnings made by other member of your group, if you want to.  You will be
shown how much EACH member of your group invested in both the Public and
Private Accounts.  Your investment decision will also appear on the screen and
will be labeled as 'YOU'. Please remember that the composition of your group will
change at the beginning of each period and therefore you will not be looking at
the same people all the time.
You must now decide how many points (if any) you wish to give to each of the
other member of your group.  You distribute points by typing them into the
input-text box that appears below the investment decision of each of the other
group members.
You will have to pay a cost to distribute points to other group members.  This
cost increases as you distribute more points to another participant.  You can
distribute between 0 and 10 points to each other member of your group.  Your
total cost of distributing points is the sum of all the costs you incur for
distributing points to each of the other group members.  The following table
illustrates the relationship between the points distributed to each group member
and the costs of doing so in francs.
Points: 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8   9   10
Cost of Points (in francs): 0  1  2  4  6  9 12 16 20  25  30
Consider the case where there are 5 people per group. Suppose you assign 2 points
to a group member. This costs you 2 francs.  If you assign 9 points to another
group member, it will cost you 25 francs and if you assign 0 points to the rest ofPunishing Free Riders          34
the members of your group, you do not incur any cost.  In this case your Total
Cost of assigning points is (2+25+0+0) or 27 francs.  At any time you will be
able to calculate your total cost of distributing points by clicking the orange
Calculate Cost button that will appear on the screen. When you have finished
distributing points you will click the blue Done button.
If you assign 0 points to a particular group member you do not change his or her
earnings.  However, for each point you assign to a group member, you reduce his
or her Gross Earnings in the current period by 10 percent.  Hence, if you assign
one group member 2 points, his or her Gross Earnings for the period will be
reduced by 20%.  Assigning 4 points reduces Gross Earnings by 40% etc.
How much a participant's earnings from the first stage are reduced is determined
by the Total amount of points he or she receives from all the other group
members.  If a participant receives a total of 3 points (from all the other group
members in the current period) then his or her Gross Earnings would be reduced
by 30 percent.  If someone is assigned 4 points in total his or her Gross Earnings
would be reduced by 40 percent.  If anybody is assigned 10 or more points their
Gross Earnings will be reduced by 100 percent.  In this case the Gross Earnings of
this person would be 0 francs for the current period.
For example, if a participant had Gross Earnings of 30 francs from the first stage
and was assigned 3 points in the second stage, then his or her earnings would be
reduced to 30 - (0.3×30) = 30 - 9 = 21 francs.
In general, your earnings after the second stage will be calculated as follows:
Total Earnings at the end of the Second Stage:
1)  If you received fewer than 10 points then Total Earnings equal
(Gross Earnings from Stage One)-[Gross Earnings×(.1×received
points)]-(the cost of points you distributed)
2)  If you receive 10 or more points then Total Earnings equal
- (the cost of the points you distributed)Punishing Free Riders          35
Please note that your earnings at the end of the second stage can be negative, if
the cost of the points you distribute exceeds your (possibly reduced) earnings
from stage one.  However, you can avoid such losses by the decisions you make.
After all participants have made their decisions in the second stage, your final
earnings for the period will be displayed in a manner similar to what follows:
Earnings Screen at the end of the Period
Your Gross Profits in the Current Period:
The Total Cost of the Points You Assigned to Others:
Number of Points Assigned to You by Others:
Reduction of Gross Profit due to Points Assigned to You:   %
Current Period Payoff after Subtractions:
Your Accumulated Earnings Including this Period:
When you have finished reviewing your earnings for the current period you will
click the orange Proceed to Next Period button and wait for others to finish.
When everyone is done, the experiment will proceed to the next period starting
with stage one.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, click the red
Finished button when you are done reading.
This is the end of the instructions. Be patient while everyone finishes reading.Punishing Free Riders          36
8. References
Ameden, H., A. Gunnthorsdottir, D. Houser and K. McCabe (1998). A minimal
property right system for the sustainable provision of public goods, University of
Arizona.
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride?  Strategies and learning in public good
experiments.  Journal of Public Economics 37: 291-304.
Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods:  A theory of
warm glow giving. Economic Journal 50: 464-477.
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (1999). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity and
competition. American Economic Review 90(March): 166-193.
Borgers, T. and R. Sarin (1997). Learning through reinforcement and replicator
dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory 77(1): 1-14.
Bowles, S., J. Carpenter and H. Gintis (2001). Mutual monitoring in teams: The
effects of residual claimancy and reciprocity. mimeo.
Carpenter, J., P. Matthews and O. Ongonga (2001). Social reciprocity. mimeo.
Davis, D. and C. Holt (1993). Experimental economics. Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher (1998). A theory of reciprocity. mimeo.
Fehr, E. and S. Gaechter (2000a). Cooperation and punishment in public goods
experiments. American Economic Review 90(4): 980-994.
Fehr, E. and S. Gaechter (2000b). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of
reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3).
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and
cooperation.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3): 769-816.
Hansen, D. (1997). Worker performance and group incentives: A case study.
Industrial and Labour Relations Review 51(1): 37-49.
Isaac, M. and J. Walker (1988). Group size effects in public goods provision:  The
voluntary contribution mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103(Feb.):
179-199.
Isaac, M., J. Walker and A. Williams (1994). Group size and the voluntary
provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 54(1): 1-36.
Keser, C. and F. van Winden (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary
contributions to public goods. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(1): 23-29.
Knez, M. and D. Simester (1998). Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring as
continental airlines. Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Latane, B. and J. Darley (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn't he
help? New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts.Punishing Free Riders          37
Ledyard, J. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. The
handbook of experimental economics. J. Kagel and A. Roth Eds. Princeton,
Princeton University Press: 111-194.
Miller, J., C. Butts and D. Rode (2002). Communication and cooperation.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 47: 179-195.
Moir, R. (1998). Spies and swords: Costly monitoring and sanctioning in a
common-pool resource environment. mimeo.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner and J. Walker (1994). Rules, games and common-pool
resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, E., J. Walker and R. Gardner (1992). Covenants with and without a
sword: Self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86: 404-417.
Page, T. and L. Putterman (2000). Cheap talk and punishment in voluntary
contribution experiments. mimeo.
Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic
Literature 37(1): 7-63.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics.
American Economic Review 83(5 December): 1281-1302.
Sefton, M., R. Shupp and J. Walker (2000). The effect of rewards and sanctions
in provision of public goods. mimeo.
Sethi, R. (1996). Evolutionary stability and social norms. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 29: 113-140.
Sethi, R. and E. Somanathan (2001). Understanding reciprocity. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization forthcoming.
Taylor, P. and L. Jonker (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game
dynamics.  Mathematical Biosciences 40: 145-156.